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Abstract 
The extant banking literature often models loan loss provisions as a linear function of changes in 
loan portfolio quality. Large sample data indicate that this linearity assumption is invalid and that 
a V-shaped piecewise linear specification fits much better. Decreases in nonperforming loans are 
associated with increases in loan loss provisions. This anomalous asymmetric relation is partly 
driven by the mechanical accounting effects of loan charge-offs on nonperforming loans and 
allowance for loan losses. We find that, controlling for concurrent loan charge-offs, loan loss 
provisions move in the same direction as nonperforming loan change, but asymmetry remains. The 
effect of nonperforming loan increases on loan loss provisions is still twice as large as that of 
nonperforming loan decreases. We argue that the residual asymmetry is caused by conditional 
conservatism. We show that loan loss provision asymmetry is greater for banks with more high-
risk construction loans, shorter-maturity loans and for public banks, and is more pronounced 
during economic downturns and in the fourth quarter, consistent with the predictable effects of 
conditional conservatism.  
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1. Introduction 
 Banks seek to reserve or allow adequately for expected losses when reporting the net 
realizable values of their loan portfolios. End-of-period adjustments to the allowance for loan 
losses are charged through loan loss provisions, which combine historical credit loss experience, 
statistical analysis and subjective judgment. Since loan loss provisions are a large expense for 
banks (averaging one tenth of net interest income), many researchers study banks’ “abnormal” or 
“discretionary” loan loss provisions. The standard approach (cf. Beatty and Liao 2014) models the 
“normal” loan loss provision as a linear function of observable credit risk indicators (e.g., change 
in nonperforming loans), implicitly assuming that loan loss provisions vary proportionally with 
changes in problem assets absent earnings manipulation.  
We evaluate this linearity assumption and find that loan loss provisions have a V-shaped 
relation with changes in nonperforming loans. Figure 1 presents a binned scatter plot of quarterly 
loan loss provisions against quarterly changes in nonperforming loans for all bank holding 
companies during 2000Q1-2015Q4. We divide the horizontal axis into 20 equal-frequency 
(quantile) bins and plot mean loan loss provisions against mean change in nonperforming loans 
(both deflated by beginning loans) in each bin. The relation between loan loss provisions and 
change in nonperforming loans is unmistakably nonlinear, as compared to the red-dashed OLS 
line, whose misspecification causes wide 95% confidence intervals. Consistent with the assumed 
linearity, loan loss provisions increase almost proportionately to increases in nonperforming loans. 
However, the positive slope flattens as nonperforming loans decrease, and in the left tail of the 
distribution with large nonperforming loan decreases, the relation slopes down instead of up. 
Importantly, the wide 95% confidence interval for the OLS line does not overlap with much of the 
data, especially at the tails and in the middle of the distribution, which could easily lead to incorrect 
inferences. 
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 We propose a piecewise linear model to more accurately summarize the joint distribution 
of loan loss provision and nonperforming loan changes. We first compare our piecewise linear 
models with the standard linear models reviewed in Beatty and Liao (2014). Many recent studies 
do not control for current-period loan charge-offs (realized loan losses) when modelling loan loss 
provisions. Loan charge-offs are innately related to loan loss provisions, reducing both 
nonperforming loans and allowance for loan losses on the balance sheet one-for-one. We argue 
that sufficiently large loan charge-offs can cause reported nonperforming loans to decrease despite 
an increase in other problem loans, and to restore an appropriate allowance, management must 
increase provisions, causing the downward sloping portion of Figure 1. Once we include loan 
charge-off as an explanatory variable, loan loss provisions decrease when nonperforming loans 
decrease, which is more in line with existing accounting/regulatory guidance and industry practice.  
However, some asymmetry remains. After controlling for the effect of loan charge-offs, a 
$1 increase in current-period nonperforming loan increases provisions by 7.3 cents, whereas a $1 
decrease in current-period nonperforming loans decreases provisions by only 3.9 cents. We 
explore conditional conservatism as an explanation for the remaining loan loss provision accrual 
asymmetry, since conservatism causes accrual asymmetry (e.g. Basu 1997; Ball and Shivakumar 
2005, 2006) and banks report in a conditionally conservative manner (e.g. Nichols, Wahlen and 
Wieland 2009; Black, Chen, and Cussatt 2018). To the extent that increases (decreases) in 
nonperforming loans reflect unrealized credit losses (gains) in the loan portfolios, conditional 
conservatism implies a higher verification threshold for recognizing nonperforming loan increases 
than nonperforming loan decreases.  
We show next that the residual loan loss provision asymmetry varies predictably with some 
theoretical sources of conditional conservatism (e.g., Basu 1997; Watts 2003a). First, we find that 
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the residual asymmetry increases with concurrent loan charge-offs. Increases in nonperforming 
loans coupled with significant charge-offs serve as a more credible indicator of probable credit 
losses, which should amplify the asymmetric timeliness of loan loss provisioning (Banker et al. 
2017). Second, we find that the asymmetry is sharpest when banks have a larger share of 
construction loans. Loans that finance construction projects are risky because the project is 
incomplete and generates no cash flows and are evaluated individually. Contrarily, for banks 
concentrated in residential real estate and consumer loans that are evaluated as homogenous pools, 
where unrealized losses on some loans are offset by unrealized gains on others, we find predictably 
less loan loss provision asymmetry.  
Next, we show that banks with larger shares of short-maturity loans exhibit greater 
asymmetry in loan loss provisions, consistent with nonperforming loan change serving as a short-
term predictor for future cash flows in loan impairment decisions. The asymmetry is greater during 
economic recessions when borrowers’ repayment ability worsens and the fair value of the 
underlying collateral is depressed. Finally, we find that the asymmetry is strongest in the fourth 
quarter and for public banks, reflecting supply of conditional conservatism by auditors and demand 
from the stock market. 
We conclude the paper by evaluating the power and specification of the competing models 
for earnings management tests. Our simulation analysis shows that absent controls for concurrent 
charge-offs, linear models of nondiscretionary loan loss provisions reject excessively in favor of 
upward (downward) earnings management in subsamples with extreme (moderate) nonperforming 
loan change, and they lack power for earnings management of plausible magnitude in the full 
sample. We show that researchers can substantially reduce misspecification by incorporating 
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piecewise linearity and (or) concurrent charge-offs, and that including loan charge-offs alone 
increases model power considerably.  
 We contribute by showing that the conventional linear model of loan loss provisions is 
misspecified by not incorporating two sources of asymmetry. We extend prior research on the 
“normal” process of accruals (e.g. Dechow 1994; Dechow and Dichev 2002; Nikolaev 2018), 
accounting conservatism (e.g., Basu, 1997; Ball and Shivakumar 2006; Byzalov and Basu 2016), 
and the timeliness of loan loss provisions (e.g., Nichols et al. 2009; Beatty and Liao 2011; Lim et 
al. 2014; Akins, Dou, and Ng 2017; Nicoletti 2018). Our findings suggest that, at a minimum, 
researchers should use loan charge-offs to predict loan loss provisions, which removes most, but 
not all, of the nonlinearity biases.   
2. Institutional Background and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. Institutional Background 
Both U.S. GAAP and regulatory guidance institutionalize longstanding reporting practices 
for bank loan portfolios. Under U.S. GAAP, loans are impaired under an “incurred loan loss 
model,” where allowances are provided for losses that are incurred, probable and reasonably 
estimable based on management’s existing information about the loan portfolio.1 The allowance 
for loan losses is a contra-asset account, reducing the net carrying value of the loan to estimated 
net realizable value. Period-end adjustments to the allowance for loan losses are made through a 
loan loss provision, which is similar to bad debt expense and reduces banks’ net income. Banks 
charge off loans, or portions thereof, when losses are later realized on an ongoing basis, by 
                                                          
1 In June 2016, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued Accounting Standards Update (ASU) 2016-
13, Financial Instruments - Credit Losses (Topic 326): Measurement of Credit Losses on Financial Instruments, which 
replaces the existing incurred loss impairment methodology with a current expected credit loss methodology (also 
known as “CECL”). Banks will be required to recognized expected credits losses “over the contractual term of the 
financial asset(s)”, considering available information about the collectability of cash flows, including information 
about “past events, current conditions, and reasonable and supportable forecasts.” (see ASC 326-20-30). CECL will 
be effective in 2020 for SEC registrant banks and 2021 for all other banks.  
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reducing the allowance and loan balances one-for-one, while leaving net income unaffected. Loan 
loss provisioning is guided by two related standards depending on whether the loans are 
individually identified for impairment: 1) loans identified for evaluation or that are individually 
considered impaired are accounted for under the Receivables Topic of Accounting Standards 
Codification (“ASC”) 310 (formerly SFAS 114, FASB 1993), and 2) non-impaired loans are 
provided general valuation allowances in accordance with the Contingency Topic of ASC 450 
(formerly SFAS 5, FASB 1975).  
Banks individually evaluate certain impaired loans—typically larger-balance business 
loans including commercial and industrial (C&I) loans and commercial real estate (CRE) loans—
and establish specific allowances for such loans if required, under ASC 310-10-35, Receivables -  
Subsequent Measurement. A loan is impaired when, based on available information, it is probable 
that a creditor will be unable to collect all contractually due interest and principal payments. Under 
this definition, loans for which interest no longer accrues (nonaccrual loans) are considered 
impaired, and the related allowances for loan losses are determined individually. Impairment is 
measured by comparing the present value of expected future cash flows, discounted at the loan’s 
historical effective interest rate, to the recorded investment of the loan. The allowance is sometimes 
determined using the loan’s fair value or the fair value of collateral for collateral-dependent loans. 
Any subsequent change in impairment is reported as an adjustment to the allowance for loan losses 
through a loan loss provision. Per ASC 310-10-35-21, banks must set aside a specific valuation 
allowance for individually impaired loans that have risk characteristics unique to borrowers. Banks 
may aggregate individually impaired loans that share common risk characteristics and provide a 
general valuation allowance based on quantitative historical loss data of the loan group. Hence, 
the allowance for impaired loans usually contains both a specific and a general reserve component.  
6 
 
Loans that do not meet the criteria to be individually evaluated are grouped into 
homogeneous pools of loans with similar risk characteristics and collectively evaluated for 
impairment, in accordance with ASC 450-20 Contingencies - Loss Contingencies. Losses inherent 
to each loan pool are statistically calculated using estimated probability of default and loss given 
default for the pool, derived from many risk factors including, but not limited to, changes in current 
economic condition, historical loss experience, and trends with respect to delinquent loans. 
Management adjusts the quantitative loss estimates using qualitative judgments, correcting for 
imprecision in the estimation models, to ensure an adequate overall allowance. A general valuation 
allowance is then determined for each loan pool. When assets are grouped into pools of similar 
characteristics for impairment, impairment triggers can be “loose,” reducing the frequency and 
amounts of impairment (Basu 2005; Byzalov and Basu 2016). This arises because unrealized 
losses on some assets can be offset by unrealized gains on other assets in the same pool. The 
prediction is that homogenous loans that are collectively evaluated for impairment will be less 
asymmetrically timely than individually impaired loans with respect to nonperforming loan 
change.  
2.2. Hypothesis Development 
We focus on the sensitivity of loan loss provisions to changes in nonperforming loans for 
three reasons. First, nonperforming loans are a relatively nondiscretionary credit quality indicator 
(Liu and Ryan 2006), which fits our objective of modelling the “normal” process of loan loss 
accruals absent earnings manipulation. Second, nonperforming loans reflect receivables’ payment 
delinquency status, which is a key trigger of probable defaults and impairments under FASB’s 
incurred loan loss approach. Third, the extant loan loss provision models assume a linear relation 
with nonperforming loan change.  
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To properly characterize the relation between loan loss provisions and nonperforming loan 
change, we propose that researchers, at a minimum, should control for the mechanical accounting 
effects of concurrent loan charge-offs (realized credit losses), which reduce both nonperforming 
loans and allowance for loan losses on the balance sheet one-for-one. When loan charge-offs are 
sufficiently large in a period, reported nonperforming loans can decrease, instead of increase, 
despite the underlying adverse trends in the credit portfolio. To replenish the allowance for loan 
losses, managers must increase provisions, and bigger decreases in nonperforming loans induce 
larger loan loss provisions. We show that imposing a linear specification without including loan 
charge-offs results in severe omitted variable bias, leading to the puzzling V-shaped relation 
between loan loss provisions and nonperforming loan changes in Figure 1. 
We argue that after controlling for concurrent loan charge-offs, loan loss provisions should 
decrease when nonperforming loans decrease. However, we expect bank loan loss provisions to 
be more sensitive to nonperforming loan increases (unrealized credit losses) than to nonperforming 
loan decreases (unrealized credit gains) reflecting conditional conservatism.  
 While condition conservatism is pervasive (e.g., see reviews by Watts 2003b, Ryan 2006 
and Barker and McGeachin 2015), and by definition flows through accruals (e.g., Basu 1997; Ball 
and Shivakumar 2005, 2006; Hsu, O’Hanlon and Peasnell 2011, 2012; Collins, Hribar and Tian 
2014; Byzalov and Basu 2016; Larson, Sloan and Giedt 2018), the existing loan loss provision 
(accrual) literature largely ignores the potential impact of conditional conservatism. An exception 
is Nichols et al. (2009), who find that the slope coefficient for nonperforming loan change is larger 
for public banks than for private banks, and interpret this finding as public banks having timelier 
loan loss provisioning than private banks. However, their model does not differentiate between 
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nonperforming loan decreases and increases, and therefore cannot speak to the conditional 
conservatism of loan loss provision. 2 
 We posit that regulatory oversight on allowance adequacy, existing accounting guidance 
for loan loss provisions, and management’s judgment in evaluating loan impairments are all likely 
to contribute to conditional conservatism in loan loss provisioning. Bank regulators, as an integral 
part of their supervisory functions, periodically review banks’ loan portfolios and the adequacy of 
the allowance for loan losses. The Commercial Bank Examination Manual states that “the 
examiner’s responsibility to determine the adequacy of a bank’s ALLL (Allowance for Loan and 
Lease Losses) is one of the most important functions of any examinations” (Federal Reserve Board 
of Governors, 1999). By monitoring loan loss reserve adequacy, regulators aim to mitigate adverse 
impacts of allowance shortfalls on bank stability and consumers’ (e.g., depositors and borrowers) 
welfare. According to the Interagency Policy Statement on the Allowance for Loan Losses, 
“prudent, conservative, but not excessive, loan loss allowances that fall within an acceptable range 
of estimated losses are appropriate.” Of course, banks discovered that prudent loan loss reserves 
helped survival centuries before bank regulators and accounting standard-setters were created.  
Changes in nonperforming loans represent likely credit gains and losses. Prior 
conservatism research reports that recognition of unrealized gains and losses is asymmetric in 
earnings and accruals (Basu 1997; Ball and Shivkumar 2006; Beaver and Ryan 2005). Larson et 
al (2018) systematically evaluate accruals and observe that a major role of accruals (besides 
                                                          
2 While recent papers study the timeliness of loan loss recognition, they do not differentiate between the effects of 
nonperforming loan increases and decreases. For example, Akins et al. (2017) measure timeliness of loan loss 
recognition as the ratio of allowance for loan loss reserves at time t to nonperforming loans at time t+1. Because this 
measure does not account for the asymmetric effects of nonperforming loan change, it likely captures the kind of 
banks with unconditionally large (or even excessive) allowances relative to nonperforming loans. Andries, Gallemore, 
and Jacob (2017) find that loan loss provisions are timelier in countries that permit tax deductibility for loan loss 
provisions. Although not key to their argument, their models do not speak to conditional conservatism in loan loss 
provisioning, since they assume a constant slope coefficient. Neither paper accounts for the mechanical effects of loan 
charge-offs, which we show is an important source of loan loss provision asymmetry.  
9 
 
alleviating transitory cash flow effects and capturing investments related to firm growth) is to 
reflect conditional conservatism, where assets must be written down or impaired if their fair values 
drop sufficiently below their carrying values. Because market prices for loans held for investment 
are often not readily available, the “fair value” of a loan is usually an entity-specific (rather than 
market-based) metric defined as the present value of expected future interest and principal 
payments discounted at the loan’s effective interest rate, which is compared to the bank’s recorded 
investment in the loan.3 If a loan’s quality deteriorates enough to be classified as “nonperforming”, 
expected future cash flows from the loan likely have dropped sufficiently below the contracted 
principal and interest amounts, which would trigger loan loss accruals. Since conditional 
conservatism is a key property of accrual accounting, we predict that loan loss provisions will 
correspond more strongly to nonperforming loan increases (unrealized losses) than to 
nonperforming loan decreases (unrealized gains). 
The asymmetry in the recognition of unrealized credit losses and gains is consistent with 
losses being accrued when probable and estimable under ASC 450-20, Contingencies - Gain 
contingencies, while gain contingencies are usually not recorded until realized under ASC 450-30, 
Contingencies - Gain contingencies. Institutional evidence suggests that bank managers use 
conservative judgment in reducing loan loss reserves when borrower repayment performance 
improves. For example, M&T Bank Corporation (2017 Form 10-K, Item 6) said, “Considering the 
inherent imprecision in the many estimates used in the determination of the allocated portion of 
                                                          
3 Recorded investment is the amount of the investment in a loan, which, unlike carrying value, is not net of valuation 
allowance, but which does reflect any direct write-downs of the investment (ASC 310-10-35). For collateral dependent 
loans, loan impairment is measured as the excess of the recorded investment in the loan over the fair value of the 
underlying collateral per ASC 320-10-35. 
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the allowance, management deliberately remained cautious and conservative in establishing the 
overall allowance for credit losses.” 4  
While the relation between loan loss provisions and change in nonperforming loans is 
unlikely to change slope at exactly a nonperforming loan change of zero (e.g. Basu, 2005), we 
predict loan loss provisioning to be more responsive to deterioration in portfolio credit quality than 
to improvements in portfolio credit quality, which leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1: Loan loss provisioning is piecewise linear with respect to increases versus decreases 
in nonperforming loans, after controlling for concurrent loan charge-offs.  
3. Data 
3.1. Sample 
We use data from the Federal Reserve (FR) Y-9C Reports, which provide detailed quarterly 
income statement and balance sheet data for all U.S. commercial bank holding companies. 
Appendix A defines all the variables we study. Our primary sample is an unbalanced panel of 
79,070 bank-quarter observations from 2,760 bank holding companies during 2000Q1 to 2015Q4. 
We log bank size to reduce right skewness and winsorize all other continuous variables at the top 
and bottom 1% to mitigate the influence of outliers. Our results are robust to using Compustat 
Bank data as an alternative source of financial data for publicly listed banks.  
3.2. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 Panel A reports descriptive statistics for our main regression variables. Quarterly 
loan loss provision scaled by beginning-of-period loan balance (LLP) has a mean of 0.14% with a 
                                                          
4 M&T Bank (Form 10-K, Item 6) also states, “Management cautiously and conservatively evaluated the allowance 
for credit losses as of December 31, 2017…. While there has been general improvement in economic conditions, 
concerns continue to exist about the strength and sustainability of such improvements.” The 10-K can be accessed via 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/36270/000156459018002855/mtb-10k_20171231.html. 
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standard deviation of 0.26%.5 As in prior research (e.g., Bushman and Williams 2012, 2015), we 
include lead, current and two lagged changes in nonperforming loans (ΔNPLt+1, ΔNPLt, ΔNPLt-1, 
ΔNPLt-2) in our regressions. Nonperforming loans are defined as 1) loans past due 90 days or more 
and no longer accruing interest plus 2) loans past due 90 days or more and still accruing interest, 
scaled by beginning loans. ΔNPLt averages 0.03% with a standard deviation of 0.57%. Net loan 
charge-offs (NCO), defined as gross loan charge-offs minus recoveries averages 0.12% of 
beginning-of-period loans with a standard deviation of 0.23%. On average, allowance for loan 
losses (ALL) comprises 1.52% of total loans. Bank asset size (SIZE), defined as the logarithm of 
total assets, averages 13.65 with a standard deviation of 1.39. Banks’ quarterly loan growth rate 
(ΔLOAN) averages 2.01%.  
 Panel B reports Pearson (Spearman) correlations between the variables below (above) the 
diagonal. Large differences in these correlation coefficients for the same variable pairs suggest 
strong nonlinearity (e.g. LLP paired with ΔNPLt, NCO or ALL). LLP correlates positively with 
ΔNPL across all four time periods. NCO and LLP are highly positively correlated, consistent with 
the mechanical accounting relation between them.  
Figure 2 presents a binned scatter plot of LLP versus NCO. We group NCO into 20 equal-
frequency bins (quantiles) and plot the mean NCO versus mean LLP by quantile bin. In contrast to 
the V-shaped curve in Figure 1, the relationship between LLP and NCO is almost perfectly linear, 
with a covariance close to one (i.e., the trend line is 45 degrees).  
4. Piecewise Linear Specification 
4.1. Model 
Our main regression employs the following piecewise linear specification: 
                                                          
5 In untabulated analyses, quarterly loan loss provisions average 11.5% of quarterly net interest income, suggesting 
that loan loss provisions have a nontrivial negative impact on bank profitability.  
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𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 = ∑ Δ𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡−𝑗 (𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝐷Δ𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡−𝑗)
2
𝑗=−1
+ ∑ 𝜃𝑗𝐷Δ𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡−𝑗
2
𝐽=−1
+ χit
′ + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝜎𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
 
  (1) 
where i indexes bank and t indexes year-quarter. Δ𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 represents the change in nonperforming 
loans from quarter t-1 to quarter t scaled by quarter t-1 total loan balance. j can assume values (-1, 
2) to incorporate lead, concurrent, and two lagged changes in nonperforming loans. ΔNPLt-1 and 
ΔNPLt-2 are included because banks consider historical trends in loan delinquency in accruing loan 
loss reserves. ΔNPLt+1 captures how well loan loss provisions predict next-period loan 
delinquency. We predict the coefficients on ΔNPLt, ΔNPLt-1, and ΔNPLt-2 to be positive; i.e., loan 
loss provisions positively correlate with both current and lagged nonperforming loan changes. 
Under current GAAP’s incurred loss model, allowance for loan losses is established to reflect 
probable credit losses that have already been incurred (ASC 310; ASC 450), and as such current-
period provisions for loan losses should have limited predictive power for future loan 
delinquencies. On the other hand, bank regulators impose a relatively more forward-looking 
approach in evaluating the adequacy of valuation allowances, with an emphasis on whether banks 
can cushion against future adverse credit and economic conditions (Beatty and Liao 2011; Nicoletti 
2018). As such, the point estimate for ΔNPLt+1 is predicted to be weakly positive or insignificant.   
DΔNPLt-j are binary indicators that equal one for ΔNPLt-j < 0, and zero otherwise. While 
we do not have a prediction for the αj intercept coefficients on these variables, H1 predicts that the 
incremental slope βj coefficients for decreases relative to increases in nonperforming loans (the 
coefficient on DΔNPLt-j × ΔNPLt-j) are negative. In addition, when controlling for loan charge-
offs, H1 predicts that the slope coefficient for current nonperforming loan decreases (the summed 
coefficient on ΔNPLt and DΔNPLt × ΔNPLt) is positive, that is, loan loss provisions decrease when 
current nonperforming loans decrease.  
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The vector of time-varying bank-specific control variables, χit
′ , includes SIZEt-1, ΔLOANt, 
NCOt, and ALLt-1. The first two variables are included in all four models reviewed by Beatty and 
Liao (2014) and studies cited therein, whereas the latter two variables are included in some, but 
not all, models. As already seen in Figure 2 above, we expect the coefficient on NCOt to be close 
to one because of “mechanical” accounting effects. ALLt-1 is included to capture the impact of 
cumulative prior loan loss accruals on current period loan loss provisions.6 𝜆𝑖 and 𝜎𝑡 represent 
bank fixed effects and year-quarter fixed effects, respectively. To account for correlations in the 
error term 𝜖𝑖𝑡 across banks and over time, we double cluster standard errors at the bank and year-
quarter level. We report adjusted R2, within-bank adjusted R2, Akaike information criterion (AIC) 
and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) to evaluate model fit. 
4.2. Baseline Results 
Table 2 reports the baseline results. We first estimate several linear specifications and 
report the results in Panel A. Column (1) replicates the linear model that, based on Beatty and 
Liao’s (2014) review, best detects serious loan loss provision management as reflected by 
accounting restatements and SEC comment letter receipts (Model (a) in their Table 4). This model 
is commonly used (e.g., Bushman and Williams 2012; Jiang et al. 2016; Nicoletti 2018). The 
model includes several quarterly macroeconomic variables: GDP change (ΔGDPt), the return on 
the Case-Shiller Real Estate index (ΔCSt), and the change in unemployment rate (ΔUNEMPLOYt). 
Column (2) replaces the quarterly macroeconomic variables in column (1) with year-quarter fixed 
effects, and column (3) additionally controls for bank fixed effects. Column (4) includes ALLt-1, 
which is similar to Model (c) in Beatty and Liao (2014), with time fixed effects in place of their 
                                                          
6 On the one hand, ALLt-1 can be positively related to LLPt to the extent that past cumulative loan losses are an 
indication of current period loan losses. On the other hand, the relation can be negative since, all else equal, bank 
management accrues fewer provisions if the existing allowance is adequate (Bhat, Ryan, and Vyas 2018).   
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macroeconomic variables. The last column also controls for NCOt, which resembles model (d) in 
Beatty and Liao (2014).   
All five models find a strong, positive relation between loan loss provisions and current-
period change in nonperforming loans. The slope coefficient for ΔNPLt ranges from 0.042 in 
column (3) to 0.057 in column (5). The next-period and the past-two-periods’ ΔNPL are also 
positively associated with LLP. Adjusted R2 improves monotonically from columns (1) through 
(5), with column (5) having by far the largest incremental adjusted R2 and within-bank adjusted R2 
due to inclusion of NCOt. In column (5), the slope coefficient for NCOt is 0.792 and highly 
significant, suggesting that a $1 increase in NCOt is associated with a 79 cent increase in LLPt.
7 
In Panel B we present estimates of the piecewise linear specifications outlined in equation 
(1). Consistent with Figure 1, absent controls for NCOt, loan loss provisions exhibit severe 
asymmetry with respect to increases versus decreases in NPL. Columns (1)–(4) show that while 
the slope coefficient for increase in NPLt is significantly positive, the slope coefficient for decrease 
in NPLt is significantly negative (summed coefficient on ΔNPLt and DΔNPLt ×ΔNPLt). The 
estimates in column (4), for instance, indicate that while a $1 increase in NPLt corresponds to a 
11.5 cent increase in LLPt on average, a $1 decrease in NPLt corresponds to a 4.9 cent increase 
(=0.164 - 0.115) in LLPt on average. Moving from columns (1) to (4), adjusted R
2 improves by 
11.5, 10.7, 6.4 and 2.7 percentage points compared to their linear versions in Panel A. For columns 
(3) and (4) that include bank fixed effects, within-bank adjusted R2 also improves by 4.9 and 3.6 
percentage points, suggesting that modeling asymmetry helps better explain both overall and 
within-bank variation in loan loss provisions. Both the AIC and BIC statistics also indicate that 
                                                          
7 The slope coefficient of 0.792 for NCO is very similar to the coefficient estimate of 0.788 in Beatty and Liao’s 
(2014) model (d) in Table 4.  
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the piecewise linear specifications provide a better fit, relative to the corresponding linear 
specifications in Panel A.  
Column (5) presents estimates of incorporating NCOt as an explanatory variable. We find 
that controlling for NCOt substantially reduces, but does not eliminate, LLP asymmetry. The 
coefficient on DΔNPLt ×ΔNPLt in column (5) is smaller than those in the first four columns but 
remains large and statistically significant at the 1% level. After controlling for NCOt, loan loss 
provisions decrease as NPL decrease. A $1 increase (decrease) in NPLt increases (decreases) LLPt 
by 7.3 cents (3.9 cents). Figure 3 Panel A plots the relation between the portion of loan loss 
provisions unexplained by loan charge-offs which is the residual from a regression of LLPt on 
NCOt. After removing the effects of NCOt, loan loss provisions generally move in the same 
direction as ΔNPL (the V-shaped nonlinearity disappears), although the slope is steeper for NPL 
increases than for NPL decreases.  
In column (6), we address the mechanical accounting effects of NCO differently. Instead 
of including NCOt as a standalone explanatory variable, we add NCOt to ΔNPLt to create a modified 
credit loss indicator (ΔNPLNCOt).8 One limitation of combining ΔNPLt and NCOt is that it forces 
them to have the same slope coefficient, which is clearly wrong given our evidence thus far. The 
point estimate for DΔNPLNCOt × ΔNPLNCOt is negative and significant (coefficient = -0.153; t-
statistic = -23.16). The summed coefficient on DΔNPLNCOt and DΔNPLNCOt × ΔNPLNCOt is 
0.002 (= 0.155 - 0.153), which indicates that the slope coefficient for decreases in NPLNCOt is 
                                                          
8 To illustrate the intuition behind this approach, suppose a bank has a $100 decrease in nonperforming loans, and, for 
simplicity, assume that half of the decrease ($50) is due to charge-offs and the other half due to genuine credit quality 
improvement. The modified measure of nonperforming loan change will equal -50 (= -100 + 50), reflecting the $50 
improvement in loan portfolio quality and avoiding misinterpretation related to charge-offs. Alternatively, suppose 
that the underlying credit quality deteriorates, and the bank experiences a $50 increase in nonperforming loans while 
charging off $50 loans for a net change of zero. The modified loan loss indicator equals $100 (= 50 + 50), which 
captures jointly the rising delinquency and confirmed credit losses (charge-offs) due to credit quality deterioration.   
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almost flat. Model fit diagnostics indicate that this alternative specification does not fit as well as 
the specification that directly controls for NCOt (column [5]). Figure 3 Panel B presents a binned 
scatter plot of LLPt versus NPLNCOt. Compared to Figure 1, adding NCOt to ΔNPLt reduces, but 
does not eliminate, the V-shape pattern. 9 
The combined evidence suggests that omitting loan charge-offs contributes most of the 
asymmetric effects of nonperforming loan change. As predicted in H1, even after controlling for 
loan charge-offs, the effect of nonperforming loan increases is twice as large as that of 
nonperforming loan decreases. Thus, the residual asymmetry is likely explained by sources other 
than loan charge-offs.10 
We test the robustness of our findings by including additional control variables. In 
untabulated tests, we obtain similar estimates when we augment equation (1) with earnings before 
loan loss provisions, Tier1 risk-based capital ratios, loan portfolio composition variables 
(including the ratios of construction loans to total loans, the ratio of commercial loans to total 
loans, and the ratio of residential real estate loans to total loan), as well as the past-two-period loan 
charge-offs as explanatory variables. We emphasize that including only historical loan charge-
offs, but not concurrent loan charge-offs, still results in V-shaped nonlinearity where the slope for 
current nonperforming loan decreases is negative. Thus, to remove the “mechanical” effect of loan 
                                                          
9 We perform an untabulated semi-parametric analysis that does not impose a specific functional form. We divide 
ΔNPL into 20 equal-frequency (quantile) bins and assign an indicator for each bin. We regress LLP on the bin 
indicators, bank controls, bank fixed effects and year-quarter fixed effects. Absent control for NCO, the coefficient 
estimates for ΔNPL quantile dummies exhibit a U-shaped pattern. Specifically, the relation between LLP and ΔNPL is 
negative below the 25th percentile of ΔNPL, nearly flat between the 25th and the 50th percentile, and positive beyond 
the 50th percentile. Controlling for NCO removes this U-shaped pattern. The coefficient estimates for the ΔNPL bin 
indicators on LLP now increase almost monotonically, with the positive slope being much steeper in the top 15th 
percentile of ΔNPL. 
10 We obtain similar estimates using annual bank data. After controlling for NCO, a $1 increase in nonperforming 
loans is associated with 12.8 cent increase in LLP, whereas a $1 decrease in nonperforming loans is associated with 
7.4 cent decrease in LLP   
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charge-offs on current-period loan loss provisions and reduce the significant nonlinearity bias, 
researchers should always include concurrent loan charge-offs, not lagged loan charge-offs.  
5. Conditional conservatism and asymmetric nonlinearity in loan loss provisioning 
We next explore whether the residual loan loss provision asymmetry (after removing the 
charge-off effects) varies predictably with the theoretical sources of conditional conservatism 
(Basu 1997; Watts 2003a). Although prior research shows that conditional conservatism pervades 
the normal accrual process, the existing loan loss provision literature does not account for the 
impact of conditional conservatism. Just as the broader accruals management literature is 
unreliable because it does not model conditional conservatism (Ball and Shivakumar 2006; 
Byzalov and Basu 2016), we suspect that the loan loss provision (a large banking accrual) models 
can be improved by incorporating conditional conservatism.  
5.1 The incremental effect of loan charge-offs 
We first evaluate whether NCO has an incremental impact on asymmetry. If increases in 
nonperforming loans are accompanied by large charge-offs, then we expect management to have 
a more precise indicator of loan portfolio deterioration and to more quickly incorporate 
nonperforming loan increases in calculating allowance for loan losses. Both ΔNPL and NCO, to 
varying degrees, reflect loan portfolio quality. When the two indicators are consistent with each 
other, the credit loss factor contained in ΔNPL is likely more credible, which according to Banker 
et al. (2017), makes LLP more sensitive to bad news (nonperforming loan increases).11 
                                                          
11 In addition, because loan charge-offs mechanically decrease nonperforming loans one-for-one, the fact that 
nonperforming loans increase despite the offsetting effects of loan charge-offs is a strong indication of deterioration 
in the bank’s loan portfolios. Thus, bank management is likely to be more conservative in establishing valuation 
allowances for nonperforming loans in response to large loan charge-offs.  
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Figure 4 illustrates the interaction effects of charge-offs on the asymmetric timeliness of 
loan loss provisions. We sort our sample into quartiles based on NCO, and within each NCO 
quartile we further sort the observations into 20 equal-frequency (quantile) bins by ΔNPL. We plot 
mean LLP against mean ΔNPL for each bin within each NCO quartile. All four curves exhibit V-
shaped relations between LLP and ΔNPL. As predicted, the V-shape appears to be sharpest in the 
top NCO quartile. 
We formally test the interaction effect of charge-offs by estimating the following 
regression: 
𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 = β0 + β1𝐷𝛥𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 + β2𝛥𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 + β3𝐷𝛥𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 × 𝛥𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 + β4𝐷𝛥𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 × 𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑖𝑡
+ β5𝛥𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 × 𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑖𝑡 + β6𝐷𝛥𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 × 𝛥𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 × 𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑖𝑡
+ β7𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑖𝑡 +  χit
′ + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝜎𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
(2) 
Where the coefficient of interest is β6 on the interaction DΔNPL×ΔNPL×NCO, which we predict 
to be negative. We include all the control variables including NCO, bank fixed effects and year-
quarter fixed effects as in equation (1). For parsimony, we focus on the contemporaneous ΔNPL–
LLP relation because conditional conservatism flows through accruals based mainly on available 
information reflecting current change in credit condition. Our results are robust if we incorporate 
both lead and two lags of ΔNPL, asymmetries, and their interactions with NCO.  
Table 3 reports the regression estimates. The coefficient on ΔNPL × NCO is positive and 
significant, suggesting that the positive slope of LLP for NPL increases is steeper when NCO is 
greater. A one standard deviation (0.23 percentage point) increase in NCO is associated with a 
16% (0.0023 × 3.728 / 0.054) increase in the positive slope of LLP for NPL increases. LLP 
asymmetry is greatest in periods of larger charge-offs. The point estimates imply that when NCO 
increases by one standard deviation, asymmetry increases by 38.5% (0.0023 × 4.688 / 0.028). 
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Thus, the evidence supports our prediction that asymmetry increases with current charge-offs, 
which is our first piece of evidence that conditional conservatism also causes LLP asymmetry.   
5.2. The incremental effect of loan portfolio composition 
We next test whether asymmetric timeliness is greater when impairment is tested on 
individual assets rather than on asset pools (Basu 2005 and Byzalov and Basu 2016). When assets 
are aggregated into pools of similar assets for impairment testing, unrealized losses in some assets 
could be offset by unrealized gains in other assets, thus decreasing, on average, the frequency and 
amount of impairment recognized for the pool. Byzalov and Basu (2016), for example, find that 
modelling accruals using segment-level indicators for unrealized future cash flows adds 
incremental explanatory power over firm-level indicators.  
Loan allowance methodology varies by loan type. Residential mortgages and non-
mortgage consumer loans such as credit card loans are typically segmented into homogeneous 
pools of similar risk characteristics to assess valuation allowances. Banks do not individually test 
impairments for such loans and rely mostly on formula-based statistical analysis to estimate 
allowances, which is more likely to induce a proportional relation between loan loss provisions 
and change in nonperforming loans (Liu and Ryan 1995). On the other hand, commercial loans 
are more idiosyncratic, and once repayment falls behind, banks need to individually evaluate those 
loans (especially larger-balance ones) for impairment. In calculating impairment for specific loans, 
management considers a wide range of quantitative and qualitative factors and are likely to take a 
more conservative judgment about borrowers’ abilities to repay. Among commercial loans, 
construction loans are particularly risky due to lack of supporting cash flows as collateral and the 
uncertain nature of construction projects. We thus expect banks to be more be more conditionally 
conservative if construction loans comprise a larger share of the banks’ loan portfolio.  
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We separate loans into four types: construction loans, commercial loans (commercial real 
estate loans plus commercial and industrial loans), residential real estate loans, and consumer loans 
(e.g., credit card loans). We study how loan loss provision asymmetry varies with banks’ loan 
portfolio concentration in each of the four loan types. We divide the amount of each of the loan 
types by total loan balance and code decile rank variables for these ratios. We re-estimate equation 
(2) using the decile ranks, one at a time, as the cross-sectional variable. On average, construction 
loans comprise 10% of the loan portfolio, while commercial loans, residential mortgages, and 
consumer loans make up 47%, 27%, and 7% of total loan balance, respectively.12  
Table 4 reports the regression results. Column (1) estimates the effect of construction loan 
shares. The key variable of interest is the triple interaction, which measures how much loan loss 
provisioning asymmetry changes for a one-decile increase in construction loan share. As predicted, 
the coefficient on the triple interaction is negative and significant, consistent with greater 
asymmetry for banks with larger shares of construction loans. According to the point estimates, a 
one-decile increase in construction loan share is associated with 0.014 increase in asymmetry. To 
provide perspective, firms in the bottom decile of construction loan share distribution have 
asymmetric timeliness of -0.026 (0.039 - 0.135 × 1), firms in the decile just below the median have 
asymmetric timeliness of 0.028 (0.039 - 0.135 × 5), and firms in the top decile have asymmetric 
timeliness of 0.096 (0.039 - 0.135 ×10). 
The results in column (2) show that commercial loan share does not affect asymmetric 
timeliness. This nil result could be because both commercial real estate loans and commercial and 
industrial loans are typically collateralized by assets such as real estate, equipment, inventory and 
                                                          
12 Note that those ratios do not add to one because banks also hold agricultural loans, loans to foreign governments 
and other loans that collectively represent a small share of total loan balance.  
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accounts receivables. Thus, even if principal and interest payments fall behind, banks need not 
impair these loans as long as they are adequately collateralized (i.e., the fair value of the underlying 
collateral at least equals the present value of future cash flows of the loan).  
Columns (3) and (4) show that asymmetric timeliness is mitigated when banks’ portfolios 
include more residential real estate loans and consumer loans, consistent with valuation allowances 
for homogenous loan pools varying more linearly with changes in nonperforming loans. For 
example, the point estimates in column (3) imply that holding other things constant, firms in the 
bottom decile of residential mortgage share have asymmetric timeliness of 0.068 (= -0.073 + 0.005 
× 1), whereas firms in the top decile have asymmetric timeliness of 0.023 (= -0.073 + 0.005 × 10), 
a reduction of 66% (= 1 - 0.023/0.068).  
The results in Table 4 are consistent with conditional conservatism driving asymmetric 
timeliness of loan loss provision, by showing that the asymmetry is greatest when banks’ loan 
portfolio is comprised of more high-risk construction loans that are individually evaluated for 
impairment and smallest when banks have more homogenous consumer and residential real estate 
loans that are tested in pools.  
5.3 The incremental effect of loan portfolio duration  
We next analyze the implications of cash flow horizons for loan impairment decisions. 
Banker et al. (2017) report that the usefulness of a loss indicator in assessing asset impairment 
depends on the indicator’s ability to predict cash flows over the asset’s life—e.g., sales change 
better predicts write-downs of (finite-lived) tangible assets, whereas stock return is more 
informative for (indefinite-lived) goodwill. Nonperforming loans are a lagged indicator for 
borrower repayment performance, and thus, are likely to be more informative in assessing shorter 
duration loans. For example, an increase in delinquent loans is likely to better predict the cash 
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flows of loans over a shorter horizon than cash flows for long-horizon loans, such as a 30-year 
fixed rate mortgage.  
We measure bank’s loan portfolio duration in two ways. First, we construct a bank-specific 
measure of the sensitivity of a bank’s loan interest income to changes in the Fed funds rate, which 
we label as loan interest beta (INTBETA).13 Following Drechsler, Savov and Schnabl (2018), we 
estimate the loan interest beta by regressing the change in each bank’s interest income rate (loan 
interest income divided by assets) on concurrent and three lags of change in the Fed funds rate. 
We then sum the coefficients to obtain a bank-specific interest income beta. Higher interest income 
beta indicates greater sensitivity of loan interest income to federal funds rate change and, therefore, 
reflects a shorter-duration loan portfolio. 
 Second, we construct a bank-quarter measure of the proportion of loans maturing or 
repricing within a year, labeled as REP1YR. The mean REP1YR in the sample is 0.436 with a 
standard deviation of 0.17, indicating that loans repricing or maturing within 1 year comprise 
43.6% of a bank’s loan portfolio on average. We code both INTBETA and REP1YR as decile rank 
variables, which we use as the cross-sectional variables when estimating equation (2).  
Table 5 present estimates of the incremental effect of loan portfolio duration. Column (1) 
employs INTBETA as the cross-sectional variable. As predicted, the coefficient on 
DΔNPL×NPL×INTBETA is negative and significant, suggesting that loan loss provision 
asymmetry is greatest when banks have higher interest income sensitivity. The estimates indicate 
that firms in the top decile of the interest beta distribution have asymmetric loan loss provisioning 
                                                          
13 Loan interest beta is an important metric used by managers, investors and regulators to analyze a bank’s interest 
income sensitivity which depends in large part on the bank’s loan portfolio mix. Typically, loan portfolios pivoted 
more heavily towards shorter-term loans have higher interest beta, which means increases in short-term interest rates 
such as federal funds rate more quickly flow to loan interest rates charged, directly affecting the bank’s earnings. The 
average interest income beta in the sample is 0.38 with a standard deviation of 1.41, which implies that, on average, 
bank interest income increases by 38 basis points (bps) per 1% increase in the Fed funds rate. 
23 
 
of 0.074 (= -0.014 - 0.006 × 10), which is almost four times as large as the asymmetric loan loss 
provisioning in the bottom decile (= -0.0.014 - 0.006). Column (2) shows similar effects using the 
proportion of loans maturing or repricing within a year as the cross-sectional variable. We find 
that loan loss provision asymmetry is 0.072 (= -0.012 - 0.006 × 10) when the proportion of loans 
maturing or repricing within one year is in the top decile of the distribution, a threefold increase 
relative to that in the bottom decile (= -0.012 - 0.006).  
5.4. Economic Recessions, Q4, and Public Banks 
We run more tests to better understand the conditional conservatism in loan loss provisions. 
First, we assess whether the asymmetry is more pronounced during economic downturn, when a 
greater focus on downside risk motivates both management and auditors to recognize bad news 
more quickly than good news (Jenkins, Kane and Velury 2009; Gunn, Khurana, and Stein 2018). 
When broad economic conditions are tough, banks’ ability to collect principal and interest 
payments in full becomes questionable. Additionally, economic stress puts downward pressure on 
the fair values of collateral securing loans, increasing probable loan losses. Therefore, loan loss 
provisions are expected to be more conservative during economic downturns. We code an indicator 
variable RECESSION denoting the two economic recessions that occurred during our sample, as 
defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).14 The first one was between 
March 2001 and November 2001, and the second one was between December 2007 and June 2009.   
Table 6 Column (1) reports the results of estimating the incremental effect of economic 
recessions on asymmetric linearity in loan loss provisioning. The point estimates suggest that, 
compared to an asymmetric timeliness of 0.026 during economic expansions, asymmetric 
timeliness is about 3.6 times as large during economic recessions at 0.121 (= -0.026 - 0.095). This 
                                                          
14 The recession dates are reported in the NBER’s US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions: 
http://www.nber.org/cycles.html.  
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result is consistent with our prediction that asymmetry is more pronounced during tough economic 
times when management establishes allowances for loan losses more conservatively.  
We next evaluate whether loan loss provision asymmetry is greater in the fourth quarter. 
Prior research reports that fourth quarter earnings exhibit greater asymmetric timeliness of bad 
news recognition due mainly to auditors’ legal liability (Basu, Hwang, and Jan 2002). If the 
observed asymmetry is driven by the effects of conditional conservatism, then we expect the 
asymmetry to be greater in the fourth quarters. Table 6 column (2) reports the test. We create a 
fourth quarter dummy, Q4, and interact it with the asymmetric linear term. Because asset 
writedowns are typically more frequent and larger in the fourth quarter (Elliott and Shaw 1988, 
Fried, Schiff and Sondhi 1989, Jones and Bublitz 1990, Zucca and Campbell 1992, and Elliott and 
Hanna 1996), it is especially important to control for current-quarter NCO. LLP asymmetry in the 
fourth quarter is 0.107 (=0.030 + 0.077), which is more than thrice that in the interim quarters 
(0.030). Consistent with prior conservatism research, we find that LLP asymmetry is accentuated 
in the fourth quarter.  
Figure 5 plots the time series of LLP asymmetry for Q4 and interim quarters. LLP 
asymmetry was stronger for Q4 during most of the sample period. Due to increasing loan 
impairments in adverse economic environments, the gap in LLP asymmetry between Q4 and 
interim quarters widened during the 2007-2008 financial crisis.  
We also predict that the LLP asymmetry is greater for public banks. Relative to private 
banks, public banks face more external scrutiny from public equity holders, securities regulators 
(i.e., the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) and shareholder class-action lawsuits. The 
asymmetric timeliness of bad news recognition is higher among public firms than private firms 
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due to public market demand for conditional conservatism (Ball and Shivakumar 2005, 2008; 
Nichols et al. 2009; Hope, Thomas, and Vyas 2013).  
In column (3), we define public banks as those whose equity shares are traded on U.S. 
stock exchanges. We code a dummy variable PUBLIC equal to one for public banks. The 
coefficient on DΔNPL × ΔNPL × PUBLIC is negative and significant, suggesting that asymmetric 
timeliness of loan loss provisions for nonperforming loan increases is greater for public banks. 
Specifically, the asymmetric coefficient increases threefold from 0.029 for private banks to 0.093 
for public banks (= -0.029 - 0.064). 
6. Implications for loan loss provisioning research 
In this section, we evaluate the specification and power of four competing loan loss 
provision models. We first examine the degree of misspecification (Type I error rate) using 
simulations similar to Kothari et al. (2005) and Collins et al. (2017), and next examine the models’ 
power to detect provisioning management (Type II error rate). The four models differ in whether 
they control for concurrent loan charge-offs and (or) piecewise linearity, which we have shown to 
be critical components of the “normal” loan loss provisioning process.  
6.1 Model specification  
We first randomly select 100 bank-quarter observations from the aggregate sample of 
79,070 observations following the simulation strategy of Kothari et al. (2005). Since those firms 
are randomly selected, one can reasonably assume there is no systematic provisioning management 
in the sample, i.e., the null hypothesis of no provisioning management is true. Thus, findings of 
significant discretionary LLP suggest model misspecification. We estimate each of the four 
competing models using the full sample and test for provisioning management in the subsample 
bank-quarters. Given that LLP is piecewise linear in ΔNPL, we also perform the analysis for 
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stratified subsamples, where 100 bank-quarter observations are drawn from a particular quintile 
ΔNPL partition. We repeat this sampling procedure 250 times with replacement. Collins et al. 
(2017) argue that the random sample should be larger and more diverse across partitions. 
Following Collins et al. (2017), we alternatively draw 2,000 bank-quarters from the aggregate 
sample, and in the case of stratified random samples, we select 1,000 observations from a given 
ΔNPL partition and 1,000 from the remaining partitions.  
Table 7 summarizes the simulation results. Panel A (B) reports the frequency with which 
the null hypothesis of no provisioning management is rejected at the 5% level against the 
alternative of positive (negative) discretionary loan loss provisions. With 250 simulations, there is 
a 95% probability that the rejection rate lies between 2.4% and 8.0% if the discretionary LLP 
measures are well-specified and the null is true. When observations are drawn from the aggregate 
sample, all models are relatively well-specified. This is not surprising because biases within ΔNPL 
partitions likely cancel out when samples are drawn across the entire distribution of ΔNPL. One 
exception is for tests using models that do not control for NCO, where the rejection rates for 
negative discretionary LLP are moderately high at about 12.8%.  
As would be expected from Figure 1, the linear model excluding NCO has excessively high 
rejection rates in favor of positive discretionary LLP in both bottom and top ΔNPL quintiles, with 
rejection rates as high as 54.8% (92.2%) when 100 (2,000) observations are drawn. The model 
also displays excessively high rejection rates in favor of negative discretionary LLP for firms in 
the middle three ΔNPL quintiles, with rejection rates as high as 66% (77%) when 100 (2,000) 
observations are drawn. Adding piecewise linearity in the model substantially alleviates 
misspecification across partitions of ΔNPL. For example, the rejection frequencies are 2.4% (1.2%) 
and 2.8% (3.6%) for firms in the bottom and top ΔNPL quintile when 100 (2,000) observations are 
27 
 
drawn. Turning to the linear model controlling for NCO, we see that the discretionary LLP 
measures are generally well-specified, except for a few cases where moderately high type I error 
rates occur. For example, the model rejects the null in favor of positive (negative) discretionary 
LLP 14.4% (14%) of the time for firms in the bottom (fourth) ΔNPL quintile when the random 
sample size is 2,000. Adding asymmetry in the model moderates the Type I error rates. For 
example, rejection frequencies drop from 14.4% (14%) to 4.8% (6.0%) for firms in the bottom 
(fourth) ΔNPL quintile when the alternative hypothesis is that discretionary LLP is positive 
(negative).  
We conclude that models controlling for concurrent NCO and (or) asymmetry with respect 
to ΔNPL are better specified than linear models excluding NCO. This finding reinforces our 
assertion that, at a minimum, researchers should control for NCO in estimating LLP. The 
simulation analysis shows that, in most instances, the piecewise linear model including NCO tends 
to yield the lowest Type I error rates.   
6.2 Power of Alternative Models to Detect Earnings Management  
We next compare the four models’ power in detecting earnings management. Following 
the procedure of Kothari et al. (2005), we randomly draw 100 bank-quarters from either the 
aggregate sample or from a given ΔNPL partition. We artificially induce earnings management in 
the selected bank-quarters by seeding positive or negative discretionary LLP that are 1, 3, or 5 
basis points (bps) of beginning loans. We estimate each of the four models using all 79,070 
observations and perform one-tailed t-tests for discretionary LLP at a significance level of 5% in 
the seeded observations. This simulation is repeated 250 times.  
Table 8 Panel A reports the frequency with which the null hypothesis of no earnings 
management is rejected in favor of positive discretionary LLP among the 250 simulation tests. 
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When only 1 bps of total loans are seeded, all models have relatively low test power. The piecewise 
linear model with (without) NCO detects the discretionary LLP 13.6% (6.4%) of the time, while 
the linear model with (without NCO) detects only 12.8% (7.2%) of the time. Model power 
improves substantially once the seed level reaches 3 bps of total loans. The linear model without 
NCO detects 28.8% of the time, while the piecewise linear model without NCO detects 31.2% of 
the time, an 8.3% improvement. Controlling for NCO in the piecewise linear model, detection rate 
almost doubles to 67.2%. Once the seed level increases to 5 bps, models controlling for NCO 
almost always reject the null, with or without the piecewise linear term. Alternatively, the linear 
models and piecewise linear models without NCO reject 78.4% and 81.6% of the time.  
The linear model without NCO has high power for detecting discretionary LLP for firms 
in the bottom and top ΔNPL quintiles. For example, the model can detect +1, +3, +5 bps LLP  about 
70.4%, 92.8%, and 99.6% of the time. Comparatively, the piecewise linear model with (without) 
NCO can detect +1, +3, +5 bps LLP about 16.4%, 49.2%, 89.6% of the time. The relatively high 
rejection rates for the linear model without NCO is due mainly to the excessive type 1 error rates 
(rather than greater power) of the model for firms with extreme ΔNPL. Importantly, controlling 
for NCO in both the linear and piecewise linear models improves model specification significantly 
without sacrificing test power across ΔNPL partitions. For example, the piecewise linear model 
with NCO can detect a 5 bps LLP about 89% (70%) of the time for firms in the bottom (top) ΔNPL 
quintile and 100% of the time for firms in the other three quintiles.  
6.3 Replication of loan loss provisioning in the 1990s Boom -  Liu and Ryan (2006) 
The specification tests indicate that failure to control for concurrent NCO biases LLP 
estimates for both extreme and moderate ΔNPL. Liu and Ryan (2006) find that, during the 1990s 
economic booms, banks accelerated loan loss provisions to smooth earnings, and that this behavior 
29 
 
is more pronounced for more profitable banks with more homogenous loans. Their LLP model 
does not include concurrent NCO as a determinant. This omission can lead to biased inferences 
concerning loan loss provisioning behavior in their setting, when nonperforming loans decreased 
sharply in a favorable economic environment (the average ΔNPL is -3.8 bps from 1990 to 2000, 
the boom period covered by Liu and Ryan (2006)). 
We first replicate the tests in Table 2 of Liu and Ryan (2006). We follow their sampling 
procedure and retain bank-year observations from the intersection of the Compustat Bank Annual 
database and the FR Y-9C reports for bank holding companies between 1991 and 2000. For 
comparability, we construct the variables based on their definitions. Table 9, column (1) reports 
the replication results. The variables of interest are earnings before provisions (X) interacted with 
a dummy for above-median return on assets (HIGHROA), and earnings before provisions (X) 
interacted with the percentage of homogenous loans in the loan portfolio (HOM%). Consistent 
with Liu and Ryan (2006), we find that these two interaction terms are significantly positive, 
suggesting that the association between loan loss provisions and earnings before loan loss 
provisions are more positive for more profitable banks and for banks with more homogenous loans. 
Given this finding, one might reasonably infer like Liu and Ryan (2006) that those banks smoothed 
income more through provisions during economic booms.  
We modify Liu and Ryan’s (2006) model by incorporating the LLP asymmetry with respect 
to ΔNPL. As shown in column (2), ΔNPL×DΔNPL has a significantly negative coefficient, 
verifying LLP asymmetry absent controls for NCO. Although the two interaction terms become 
smaller, they remain positive and significant. This is not the case, however, once we include NCO 
in the model. Columns (3) and (4) show that once NCO is controlled for, bank profitability and the 
proportion of homogenous loans are no longer positively associated with bank earnings smoothing. 
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We also note that the asymmetry term, ΔNPL×DΔNPL, is insignificant once NCO is included in 
the model, which is likely due to a sampling issue as we lose a significant number of banks when 
merging the Compustat Bank dataset with FR Y-9C reports.15 In summary, controlling for 
concurrent NCO in the LLP model calls into question Liu and Ryan’s (2006) inference regarding 
banks’ loan loss provisioning behavior during economic booms.  
7. Conclusion 
The standard approach in modelling loan loss provisions is based on linear projections of 
loan loss provisions on changes in loan portfolio quality observable to the researcher (i.e., changes 
in nonperforming loans). An implicit assumption is that loan loss provisions change proportionally 
to changes in nonperforming loans. This linearity assumption, we find, is strongly rejected by 
large-sample data. Given the observed data patterns and the accounting and regulatory guidance 
for loan loss accruals, we propose a piecewise linear specification that accommodates asymmetric 
loan loss provisioning. Our model yields two key findings. First, failing to control for the 
mechanical accounting effects of loan charge-offs on nonperforming loans and allowance for loan 
losses induces severe nonlinearity (a V-shaped curve), where loan loss provisions increase 
proportionally to decreases in nonperforming loan. Second, after controlling for loan charge-offs, 
loan loss provisions move in the same direction as nonperforming loan change, with loan loss 
provisions changing more with nonperforming loan increases than with nonperforming loan 
decreases.   
We show that the residual asymmetry is at least partly due to conditional conservatism. We 
find that the asymmetric nonlinearity is greatest when banks’ loan portfolio is comprised of more 
                                                          
15 In untabulated analysis, we verify that using only the Compustat Bank dataset or only FR Y-9C reports financial 
data, the asymmetric nonlinear term is negative and significant for the period 1991-2000, when we include controls 
for NCO. We note that the restricted sample used in Table 11 is unlikely to lead to the insignificant results for the 
two interaction terms because, when NCO is excluded, those two terms are highly significant.  
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high-risk construction loans that are individually impaired and smallest when banks have more 
homogenous consumer and residential real estate loans that are tested in pools. We also show that 
the loan loss provision asymmetry is greater for banks with shorter-maturity loan portfolios, 
consistent with changes in nonperforming loans being a more relevant indicator for unrealized 
credit losses over a shorter time horizon. The nonlinearity in loan loss provisioning is also more 
pronounced when banks larger concurrent charge-offs, are publicly traded, in the fourth quarter 
and during recessions, all consistent with conditional conservatism playing an important role in 
loan loss provisioning.  
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Appendix A 
Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
LLP Loan loss provisions (BHCK4230) scaled by lagged loans (BHCK2122). 
ΔNPL 
Change in nonperforming loans (BHCK5525+BHCK5526) scaled by lagged 
loans. 
SIZE Logarithm of lagged total assets (BHCK2170). 
ΔLOAN Change in loan (BHCK2122) scaled by lagged loans. 
ALL Allowance for loan losses (BHCK3123) scaled by lagged loans. 
NCO Net charge-offs (BHCK4635-BHCK4605) scaled by lagged loans. 
ΔNONACC Change in nonaccrual loans (BHCK5526) scaled by lagged loans. 
ΔACC 
Change in accruing loans 90 days or more past due (BHCK5525) scaled by 
lagged loans. 
ΔNPLNCO 
Change in nonperforming loans (BHCK5525+BHCK5526) plus net charge-offs 
(BHCK4635-BHCK4605) scaled by lagged loans. 
CONSTRUCTION 
The ratio of construction loans (BHCKF158+BHCKF159) to total loans 
(BHCK2122). 
COMMERCIAL  
The ratio of non-construction commercial loans 
(BHCK1460+BHCK1763+BHCK1764) to total loans (BHCK2122). 
RESIDENTIAL 
REAL ESTATE 
The ratio of residential real estate mortgage loans 
(BHCK1797+BHCK5367+BHCK5368) to total loans 
CONSUMER 
The ratio of consumer loans 
(BHCKB538+BHCKB539+BHCKK137+BHCKK207) to total loans 
INTBETA 
The sensitivity of loan interest income to changes in Fed funds rate, calculated 
by regressing the change in a bank's interest income rate on the contemporaneous 
and three lagged quarterly changes in the Fed funds rate. Interest beta is the sum 
of the coefficients on the four changes in the Fed funds rate. Interest income rate 
is calculated as quarterly interest income divided by quarterly average assets and 
then annualized (multiplied by four). 
REP1YR 
Loans maturing or repricing within 1 year (RCONA564+RCONA565 
+RCFDA570+RCFDA571) as a proportion of total loans. Loan repricing data 
are from commercial bank call reports (FFIEC 031/041 forms) and are 
aggregated to the holding company level using financial high holder ID 
RSSD9364. 
RECESSION 
An indicator variable denoting economic recessions during the sample period. 
According to NBER, the first one was between March 2001 and November 
2001, and the second one was between December 2007 and June 2009 
Q4 An indicator for fourth quarter. 
PUBLIC 
An indicator for public banks, defined as those whose equity shares are traded on 
U.S. stock exchanges. Public banks are identified via the RSSD (bank regulatory 
identification number)-PERMCO (permanent company number used by CRSP) 
link table provided by Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  
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FIGURE 1 
Unconditional Relation Between LLP and ΔNPL (Raw Data) 
 
 
This figure presents a binned scatter plot of the relationship between quarterly loan loss provisions 
and quarterly change in nonperforming loans. To construct this figure, we divide quarterly change 
in nonperforming loan (scaled by beginning-of-the-quarter loans) into 20 equal-sized (quantile) 
bins and plot the mean loan loss provisions versus the mean change in nonperforming loans (both 
scaled by beginning loans) by quantile bins. The light blue dashed lines represent the 95% 
confidence interval of loan loss provisions within each quantile bin. The orange line represents 
the OLS fit for the scatter plot, and the light orange dashed lines represent the 95% confidence 
interval for the OLS fit.  
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FIGURE 2 
Unconditional Relation Between LLP and NCO (Raw Data) 
 
This figure presents a binned scatter plot of the relationship between quarterly loan loss provisions 
and net loan charge-offs. To construct this figure, we divide quarterly net charge-offs (scaled by 
beginning-of-the-quarter loans) into 20 equal-sized (quantile) bins and plot the mean loan loss 
provisions versus the mean net loan charge-offs (both scaled by beginning loans) by quantile bins. 
The light blue dashed lines represent the 95% confidence interval of loan loss provisions within 
each quantile bin.  
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FIGURE 3 
Controlling for the Effects of Concurrent Loan Charge-offs 
                               Panel A: Loan Loss Provisions Unexplained by Charge-offs  
Panel B: Nonperforming Loan Change Plus Charge-offs 
The figures plot the relationship between loan loss provisions and nonperforming loan change, controlling for the 
effects of loan charge-offs in two alternative ways. Panel A presents a binned scatter plot of the mean loan loss 
provisions unexplained by loan charge-offs versus mean nonperforming loan change (both deflated by beginning loan 
balance) across 20 (equal-frequency) quantile bins by nonperforming loan change. The unexplained portion of loan 
loss provisions is derived from the residuals of the regression of loan loss provisions on concurrent loan charge-offs. 
Panel B presents a binned scatter plot of the mean loan loss provisions against mean nonperforming loan change plus 
concurrent loan charge-offs (both deflated by beginning loan balance) across 20 (equal-frequency) quantile bins by 
nonperforming loan change plus loan charge-offs.  
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FIGURE 4 
LLP vs ΔNPL Conditional on NCO  
 
This figure plots the interactive effects of net loan charge-offs (NCO) on asymmetry loan loss provisions 
for nonperforming loan increases versus decreases. To construct this figure, we the sample into quartiles 
based on NCO, and within each NCO quartile we further divide observations into 20 equal-frequency 
(quantile) bins by nonperforming loan change (ΔNPL). We create a binned scatter plot of mean loan loss 
provisions against mean loan charge-offs (both scaled by beginning loans) within each NCO quartile. 
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FIGURE 5 
LLP Asymmetry for Q4 and Interim Quarters Over Time 
                                
The figure plots LLP asymmetry for fourth quarter and interim quarters over the sample period. We run the 
following regression by year: 
𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 = β0 + β1𝐷𝛥𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 + β2𝛥𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 + β3𝐷𝛥𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 × 𝛥𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 + β4𝐷𝛥𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 × 𝑄4 + β5𝛥𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 × 𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑖𝑡
+ β6𝐷𝛥𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 × 𝛥𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 × 𝑄4 + β7𝑄4 +  χit
′ + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
where Q4 is an indicator variable for fourth quarter of the year. Coefficient β3 represents LLP asymmetry for Q1-Q3 
of each year, and coefficient β3+β6 represents LLP asymmetry for Q4 each year. Red-dashed lines represent LLP 
asymmetry estimates obtained from the model controlling for NCO, and blue-solid lines represent LLP asymmetry 
estimates obtained from the model excluding NCO. Circles represent Q4 LLP asymmetry, and triangles represent 
interim quarters LLP asymmetry. 
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TABLE1 
Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (N = 79,070) 
  Mean Std p25 Median p75 
LLPt 0.14% 0.26% 0.03% 0.07% 0.14% 
ΔNPLt+1 0.03% 0.58% -0.14% 0.00% 0.14% 
ΔNPLt 0.03% 0.57% -0.14% 0.00% 0.14% 
ΔNPLt-1 0.03% 0.57% -0.13% 0.00% 0.14% 
ΔNPLt-2 0.03% 0.55% -0.13% 0.00% 0.14% 
ΔLOANt 2.01% 4.53% -0.49% 1.57% 3.84% 
NCOt 0.12% 0.23% 0.01% 0.04% 0.12% 
ALLt-1 1.52% 0.67% 1.11% 1.36% 1.72% 
SIZEt-1 13.65 1.39 12.68 13.37 14.12 
 
Panel B: Pearson/Spearman Correlations 
  LLPt ΔNPLt+1 ΔNPLt ΔNPLt-1 ΔNPLt-2 NCOt ALLt-1 ΔLOANt SIZEt-1 
LLPt  0.037 0.088 0.120 0.127 0.612 0.198 -0.091 0.128 
ΔNPLt+1 0.078  0.002 0.047 0.044 -0.023 -0.110 0.060 0.003 
ΔNPLt 0.146 0.039  0.001 0.044 -0.059 -0.092 0.067 0.006 
ΔNPLt-1 0.174 0.064 0.034  -0.002 0.075 -0.039 -0.006 0.009 
ΔNPLt-2 0.176 0.048 0.056 0.029  0.078 -0.040 -0.036 0.006 
NCOt 0.797 -0.006 -0.025 0.120 0.138  0.313 -0.261 0.211 
ALLt-1 0.359 -0.105 -0.080 0.000 -0.005 0.503  -0.206 0.149 
ΔLOANt -0.161 0.038 0.085 -0.018 -0.050 -0.243 -0.218  -0.062 
SIZEt-1 0.128 0.009 0.012 0.014 0.013 0.147 0.126 -0.024  
This table presents summary statistics for the variables used in the main regression analyses. Panel A reports the descriptive 
statistics of the variables and Panel B reports the Pearson (Spearman) correlations between the variables below (above) the 
diagonal. Bold face indicates significance level at the 10% level in two-tailed tests. Variable definitions are in the Appendix 
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TABLE 2 
Loan Loss Provisions Models 
Panel A: Linear models (N = 79,070) 
    LLP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ΔNPLt+1                                       0.015*** 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
  (5.29) (6.42) (5.55) (7.69) (9.81) 
ΔNPLt + 0.050*** 0.046*** 0.042*** 0.047*** 0.057*** 
  (15.70) (15.00) (14.44) (16.57) (25.79) 
ΔNPLt-1 + 0.057*** 0.049*** 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.023*** 
  (20.06) (17.59) (16.85) (16.66) (12.23) 
ΔNPLt-2 + 0.058*** 0.047*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.016*** 
  (21.13) (17.72) (16.58) (17.10) (8.94) 
SIZEt-1  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
  (6.03) (5.75) (6.19) (8.16) (6.25) 
ΔLOANt  -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.003*** 0.000** 
  (-19.28) (-14.45) (-14.58) (-12.31) (2.14) 
ΔGDPt  0.013***     
  (7.85)     
ΔCSt  -0.026***     
  (-23.41)     
ΔUNEMPLOYt  0.003***     
  (9.67)     
ALLt-1 -    0.079*** -0.044*** 
     (17.10) (-14.66) 
NCOt +     0.792*** 
      (85.97) 
Bank FE  No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter FE  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2  0.157 0.225 0.404 0.446 0.701 
Adj. within bank R2    0.28 0.3 0.628 
AIC  -733,270 -739,955 -763,531 -769,275 -818,040 
BIC   -733,178 -739,751 -763,438 -769,183 -817,947 
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Panel B: Piecewise linear models (N = 79,070) 
    LLP 
        (1)       (2)         (3)        (4)       (5)      (6)  
ΔNPL t+1                                        0.067*** 0.067*** 0.056*** 0.053*** 0.036*** 0.050*** 
  (18.08) (18.10) (16.01) (15.33) (13.05) (17.21) 
ΔNPL t + 0.136*** 0.129*** 0.119*** 0.115*** 0.073*** 0.155*** 
  (29.11) (27.79) (26.47) (25.98) (20.68) (37.64) 
ΔNPL t-1 + 0.089*** 0.080*** 0.072*** 0.064*** 0.039*** 0.071*** 
  (20.75) (18.26) (17.02) (15.32) (12.29) (20.81) 
ΔNPL t-2 + 0.092*** 0.074*** -0.079*** 0.061*** 0.023*** 0.063*** 
  (20.93) (16.72) (-13.01) (14.66) (7.58) (19.06) 
DΔNPLt+1 × ΔNPLt+1  -0.111*** -0.107*** -0.088*** -0.075*** -0.039*** -0.030*** 
  (-17.22) (-17.05) (-14.88) (-12.69) (-8.22) (-5.13) 
DΔNPLt  × ΔNPLt - -0.214*** -0.195*** -0.177*** -0.164*** -0.034*** -0.153*** 
  (-28.06) (-26.09) (-24.80) (-23.22) (-6.65) (-23.16) 
DΔNPLt-1 × ΔNPLt-1 - -0.110*** -0.096*** -0.079*** -0.064*** -0.041*** -0.061*** 
  (-17.98) (-15.30) (-13.01) (-10.41) (-8.47) (-10.32) 
DΔNPLt-2 × ΔNPL t-2 - -0.123*** -0.093*** -0.076*** -0.063*** -0.024*** -0.067*** 
  (-18.46) (-13.84) (-12.28) (-10.19) (-5.26) (-11.52) 
SIZEt-1  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
  (10.24) (10.03) (7.40) (9.08) (6.50) (5.13) 
ΔLOANt  -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** 0.001*** -0.002*** 
  (-11.17) (-7.82) (-10.29) (-8.76) (4.27) (-9.62) 
ΔGDPt  0.017***      
  (10.55)      
ΔCSt  -0.012***      
  (-12.40)      
ΔUNEMPLOYt  0.004***      
  (14.19)      
ALLt-1     0.047*** -0.054*** 0.024*** 
     (9.94) (-17.13) (6.37) 
NCOt      0.760***  
      (78.31)  
Slope coefficient for nonperforming loan decreases  
ΔNPLt+1 +DΔNPLt+1 × ΔNPLt+1 -0.044*** -0.040*** -0.032*** -0.022*** -0.003 0.020*** 
ΔNPLt + DΔNPLt × ΔNPLt -0.078*** -0.066*** -0.058*** -0.049*** 0.039*** 0.002 
ΔNPLt-1 + DΔNPLt-1 × ΔNPLt-1 -0.021*** -0.016*** -0.007 0.000 -0.002 0.010** 
ΔNPLt-2 + DΔNPLt-2 × ΔNPLt-2 -0.031*** -0.019*** -0.011*** 0.002 -0.001 -0.004 
Bank FE  No No Yes Yes      Yes      Yes 
Year-quarter FE  No Yes Yes Yes      Yes      Yes 
adj. R-sq  0.272 0.332 0.468 0.473     0.709     0.543 
Within adj. R    0.329 0.336     0.633     0.423 
AIC  -744898 -751557 -772583 -773351   -820250   -778429 
BIC   -744731 -750834 -772490 -773258   -820157   -778336 
 
45 
 
This table presents the results of the main regression analysis. Panel A estimates several linear specifications. Column (1) 
replicates model (a) in Beatty and Liao (2014). The model includes several macroeconomic variables: change in GDP over the 
quarter (ΔGDP), the return on the Case-Shiller Real Estate index over the quarter (ΔCS), and change in unemployment rates over 
the quarter (ΔUNEMP). Column (2) replaces the macroeconomic variables in column (1) with the more restrictive year-quarter 
fixed effects, and column (3) additionally controls for bank fixed effects. Column (4) includes beginning-of-period allowance 
for loan losses (ALL), which is similar to Model (c) in Beatty and Liao (2014). The last column controls for current-period loan 
charge-offs (NCO), which resembles model (d) in Beatty and Liao (2014). Panel B estimates piecewise linear specifications. t-
statistics are reported in parentheses based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors two-way clustered at the bank and year-
quarter level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tail). See the Appendix for 
definitions of all variables in the regressions. The standalone DΔNPL variables are included in the regression. Since the 
coefficients on those variables all close to zero and insignificant, we do not report those coefficients to conserve space.
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TABLE 3 
The Incremental Effect of Loan Charge-offs (NCO) 
  LLP 
ΔNPLt + 0.054*** 
  (14.83) 
DΔNPLt ×ΔNPLt - -0.028*** 
  (-5.19) 
Effect of Loan Charge-offs on the Recognition of ΔNPL 
ΔNPLt × NCOt + 3.728*** 
  (3.74) 
DΔNPLt × ΔNPLt × NCOt - -4.688** 
  (-2.48) 
SIZEt-1  0.000*** 
  (6.59) 
ΔLOANt  0.001*** 
  (4.61) 
ALLt-1  -0.054*** 
  (-17.15) 
NCOt  0.787*** 
  (52.69) 
FE  Bank, Year-Quarter 
N   79,070 
Adj. R2   0.705 
Adj. within bank R2  0.628 
This table presents the results of estimating the effect of loan charge-offs on asymmetric loan loss 
provisioning. NCO is net charge-offs, defined as gross charge-offs minus recoveries, divided by 
lagged loans. t-statistics are reported in parentheses based on heteroscedasticity robust standard 
errors two-way clustered at the bank and year level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tail).  
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TABLE 4 
The  Effect of Loan Portfolio Composition 
  Loan Portfolio Composition (LPC) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Construction  Commercial 
Residential 
Real Estate 
Consumer 
ΔNPLt + 0.019*** 0.079*** 0.090*** 0.103*** 
  (2.63) (10.39) (13.16) (14.38) 
DΔNPLt ×ΔNPLt - 0.039*** -0.048*** -0.073*** -0.082*** 
  (3.43) (-4.17) (-7.22) (-7.89) 
Effect of Loan Portfolio Composition on the Recognition of ΔNPL 
ΔNPLt × LPC + 0.009*** -0.000 -0.003** -0.006*** 
  (8.13) (-0.18) (-2.24) (-4.71) 
DΔNPLt × ΔNPLt × LPC - -0.014*** -0.000 0.005*** 0.007*** 
  (-7.33) (-0.09) (3.08) (4.00) 
SIZEt-1  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
  (7.28) (8.62) (8.19) (8.40) 
ΔLOANt  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 
  (3.58) (3.01) (2.98) (3.36) 
ALLt-1  -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.050*** 
  (-15.91) (-15.94) (-15.81) (-15.93) 
NCOt  0.771*** 0.776*** 0.775*** 0.774*** 
  (80.59) (81.04) (80.60) (80.35) 
FE  
Bank, Year-
Quarter 
Bank, Year-
Quarter 
Bank, Year-
Quarter 
Bank, Year-
Quarter 
N   79,061 79,022 79,045 78,879 
Adj. R2  0.704 0.702 0.703 0.702 
Adj. within bank R2   0.626 0.624 0.624 0.624 
This table presents the results of estimating the effect of loan portfolio composition (LPC) on nonlinear loan 
loss provisioning. Column (1) uses as the ratio of construction loans divided by total loans as the cross-sectional 
variable, and column (2) uses non-construction commercial loans, which in commercial and include commercial 
and industrial loans and commercial real estate loans, divided by total loans. Column (3) uses residential 
mortgages divided by total loans. Column (3) uses consumers (excluding residential real estate mortgages), such 
as car loans and credit card loans, as a proportion of total loans. Each loan portfolio composition variable is 
converted to a decile rank variable. t-statistics are reported in parentheses based on heteroscedasticity robust 
standard errors two-way clustered at the bank and year level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tail).  
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TABLE 5 
The Effect of Loan Portfolio Maturity  
  Loan Portfolio Maturity 
    (1) (2) 
  
Loan Interest 
Beta  
Loans 
maturing/repricing 
within a year 
ΔNPL t + 0.048*** 0.051*** 
  (6.37) (6.25) 
DΔNPLt ×ΔNPLt - -0.014 -0.012 
  (-1.29) (-1.08) 
Effect of Loan Portfolio Maturity on the Recognition of ΔNPL 
ΔNPLt × LPM + 0.005*** 0.004*** 
  (4.19) (3.34) 
DΔNPLt × ΔNPLt × LPM - -0.006*** -0.006*** 
  (-3.20) (-3.59) 
SIZEt-1  0.000*** 0.000*** 
  (8.44) (8.20) 
ΔLOANt  0.001*** 0.001*** 
  (3.24) (3.25) 
NCOt  0.775*** 0.770*** 
  (80.24) (76.39) 
ALLt-1  -0.049*** -0.053*** 
  (-15.97) (-16.16) 
FE 
 
Bank, Year-
Quarter 
Bank, Year-           
Quarter 
N   77,968 74,262 
Adj. R2  0.703 0.696 
Adj. within bank R2   0.625 0.616 
This table presents the results of estimating the effect of loan portfolio maturity on asymmetry loan loss 
provisioning asymmetry. We use two variables to proxy for loan portfolio maturity. Column (1) uses loan 
interest income beta (INTBETA), which is defined as the sensitivity of loan interest income to change in Fed 
funds rate. To construct this measure, for each bank we regress the quarterly change in a bank's interest income 
rate on the contemporaneous and three lagged quarterly changes in the Fed funds rate. Interest beta is the sum 
of the coefficients on the four changes in the Fed funds rate. A greater interest beta indicates banks with lower 
maturity loan portfolio. Column (2) uses the proportion of loan portfolios repricing or maturing within a year 
(MAT1YR). Both variables are coded as decile ranks. INTBETA is time-invariant for each bank and therefore 
is subsumed by bank fixed effects. The coefficient on standalone MAT1YR close to zero and insignificant and 
thus is not tabulated. t-statistics reported in parentheses are two-way clustered at the bank and year level. *, 
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tail).  
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TABLE 6 
Economic Recessions, Q4 Reporting, and Public Banks 
  VAR 
    (1) (2) (3) 
  RECESSION Q4 PUBLIC 
ΔNPLt + 0.059*** 0.066*** 0.062*** 
  (15.43) (17.28) (15.48) 
DΔNPLt ×ΔNPLt - -0.026*** -0.030*** -0.029*** 
  (-4.80) (-5.54) (-4.91) 
Effect of Recessions, Q4, and Public Banks on the Recognition of  ΔNPL 
ΔNPLt × VAR + 0.061*** 0.050*** 0.053*** 
  (8.48) (6.24) (7.12) 
DΔNPLt × ΔNPLt × VAR - -0.095*** -0.077*** -0.064*** 
  (-7.71) (-6.65) (-5.79) 
SIZEt-1  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
  (8.17) (8.66) (8.30) 
ΔLOANt  0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000** 
  (3.15) (2.95) (2.27) 
ALLt-1  -0.048*** -0.049*** -0.050*** 
  (-15.61) (-15.86) (-16.28) 
NCOt  0.775*** 0.773*** 0.774*** 
  (80.60) (80.18) (81.40) 
FE  
Bank, Year-
Quarter 
Bank, Year-
Quarter 
Bank, Year-
Quarter 
N   79,070 79,070 79,070 
Adj. R2  0.703 0.703 0.703 
Adj. within bank R2  0.626 0.625 0.626 
This table estimates the incremental effect of economic recessions, fourth quarter reporting, and public banks on 
asymmetric loan loss provisioning. In column (1), RECESSION is an indicator variable denoting economic recessions 
during the sample period. According to NBER, the first one was between March 2001 and November 2001, and the 
second one was between December 2007 and June 2009. The standalone RECESSION is subsumed by year-quarter 
fixed effects. In column (2), Q4 is an indicator variable for fourth quarter loan loss provisions. The standalone Q4 
variable is omitted due to inclusion of year-quarter fixed effects. In column (3), PUBLIC is an indicator variable if 
the bank is publicly listed. The standalone PUBLIC is subsumed by bank fixed effects. t-statistics reported in 
parentheses are two-way clustered at the bank and year level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tail).  
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TABLE 7 
 Specification Tests of Earnings Management through  LLP (Type I Error) 
 
Panel A: H1: Discretionary LLP>0  
 
All 
banks 
ΔNPL 
Bottom 
ΔNPL 
Q2 
ΔNPL 
Q3 
ΔNPL 
Q4 
ΔNPL 
Top 
100 random bank-quarters following Kothari et al. (2005) 
Linear without NCO (Table 2, 
Panel A, Column 4) 
2.8 54.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.8 
Piecewise linear without NCO 
(Table 2, Panel B, Column 4) 
3.6 2.8 2.4 4.4 2.8 2.4 
linear with NCO (Table 2, 
Panel A, Column 5) 
5.2 10.0 2.4 3.2 0.8 3.6 
Piecewise linear with NCO 
(Table 2, Panel B, Column 5) 
2.8 5.6 3.6 5.2 3.6 1.6 
2000 random bank-quarters following Collins et al. (2017) 
Linear without NCO (Table 2, 
Panel A, Column 4) 
5.2 97.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 68.4 
Piecewise linear without NCO 
(Table 2, Panel B, Column 4) 
5.6 3.6 3.6 6.0 3.6 1.2 
linear with NCO (Table 2, 
Panel B, Column 4) 
5.2 14.4 4.0 3.6 2.4 4.0 
Piecewise linear with NCO 
(Table 2, Panel B, Column 5) 
6.0 4.8 4.0 10.0 10.4 2.8 
       
Panel B: H1: Discretionary LLP<0 
 
All 
banks 
ΔNPL 
Bottom 
ΔNPL 
Q2 
ΔNPL 
Q3 
ΔNPL 
Q4 
ΔNPL 
Top 
100 random bank-quarters following Kothari et al. (2005) 
Linear without NCO (Table 2, 
Panel A, Column 4) 
12.8 0.0 66.0 59.6 65.2 0.4 
Piecewise linear without NCO 
(Table 2, Panel B, Column 4) 
12.8 9.6 10.8 5.2 8.4 11.6 
linear with NCO (Table 2, 
Panel A, Column 5) 
5.2 1.6 8.8 9.2 15.2 8.4 
Piecewise linear with NCO 
(Table 2, Panel B, Column 5) 
4.8 4.0 7.6 4.4 5.2 11.6 
2000 random bank-quarters following Collins et al. (2017) 
Linear without NCO (Table 2, 
Panel A, Column 4) 
6.4 0.0 77.6 68.4 77.6 0.0 
Piecewise linear without NCO 
(Table 2, Panel B, Column 4) 
6.4 6.4 6.4 2.0 2.8 8.4 
linear with NCO (Table 2, 
Panel A, Column 5) 
6.4 0.8 9.6 4.0 14.0 2.4 
Piecewise linear with NCO 
(Table 2, Panel B, Column 5) 
7.6 6.8 6.8 0.4 6.0 8.0 
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This table presents the rejection rates for the null hypothesis of no earnings management through discretionary loan 
loss provisions for 100 (2000) suspect earnings management banks against the alternative hypothesis of positive 
discretionary loan loss provisions (Panel A and B) or negative discretionary loan loss provisions (Panels C and D). In 
Panels A and C, 100 bank-quarters are randomly drawn from either the aggregate sample or each of the five quintiles 
of bank-quarters ranked by nonperforming loan change. We follow the test procedure of Kothari et al. (2005) and 
report the percentage of 250 simulation tests for which the null hypothesis of no earnings management is rejected at 
the 5% level using a one-tailed t-test. In Panels B and D, 2,000 bank-quarters are randomly drawn, 50% of which are 
from the quintile of bank-quarters ranked by nonperforming loan change of interest, and the other 50% of which are 
from the remaining four quintiles. We follow the test procedure of Collins et al. (2017) and report the percentage of 
250 simulations tests for which the null hypothesis of no earnings management is rejected at the 5% level using a one-
tailed t-test for mean. Rejection rates that are significantly less than the nominal significance level is in bold italics, 
and rejection rates that are significantly more than the nominal significance level is in bold.  
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TABLE 8 
Power of Tests for Earnings Management through LLP (Type II Error) 
Panel A: H1: Discretionary LLP>0 
 
All  
banks 
ΔNPL  
Bottom 
ΔNPL  
Q2 
ΔNPL  
Q3 
ΔNPL  
Q4 
ΔNPL  
Top 
Induced positive discretionary LLP 
Linear without NCO (Table 2, Panel A, Column 4) 
+1 bps 6.4 70.4 0.0 0.0 0.4 35.2 
+3 bps 28.8 92.8 4.8 4.8 2.4 64.0 
+5 bps 78.4 99.6 52.0 50.8 37.6 88.0 
Piecewise linear without NCO (Table 2, Panel B, Column 4) 
+1 bps 7.2 5.6 13.2 17.2 14.0 5.2 
+3 bps 31.2 22.4 81.6 87.6 82.0 16.4 
+5 bps 81.6 58.4 99.2 100.0 100.0 42.0 
linear with NCO (Table 2, Panel A, Column 5) 
+1 bps 12.8 24.4 24.8 24.8 14.8 10.8 
+3 bps 68.6 62.8 92.4 97.2 91.2 43.6 
+5 bps 98.4 92.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 81.6 
Piecewise linear with NCO (Table 2, Panel B, Column 5) 
+1 bps 13.6 16.4 29.6 40.4 33.6 7.2 
+3 bps 67.2 49.2 93.2 99.6 96.4 36.8 
+5 bps 98.4 89.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 70.0 
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Panel B: H1: Discretionary LLP<0 
 
All firm 
ΔNPL 
Bottom 
ΔNPL 
Q2 
ΔNPL 
Q3 
ΔNPL 
Q4 
ΔNPL 
Top 
Induced negative discretionary LLP 
Linear without NCO (Table 2, Panel A, Column 4) 
-1 bps 19.6 0.4 80.0 72.4 81.6 2.0 
-3 bps 48.8 2.0 96.8 92.8 96.0 8.0 
-5 bps 72.8 8.4 99.2 98.4 98.4 19.2 
Piecewise linear without NCO (Table 2, Panel B, Column 4) 
-1 bps 19.2 16.8 34.0 27.6 20.4 17.2 
-3 bps 50.4 36.4 73.2 63.6 62.8 34.4 
-5 bps 76.8 61.2 94.4 88.4 90.8 57.2 
linear with NCO (Table 2, Panel A, Column 5) 
-1 bps 24.0 6.0 45.2 46.4 56.4 16.8 
-3 bps 73.2 33.6 94.8 93.6 95.6 44.0 
-5 bps 94.8 75.6 99.6 99.6 99.6 75.2 
Piecewise linear with NCO (Table 2, Panel B, Column 5) 
-1 bps 24.0 14.0 41.2 28.8 32.4 22.0 
-3 bps 74.8 50.8 92.0 91.2 90.0 50.8 
-5 bps 94.8 84.4 99.6 99.6 99.2 78.4 
This table reports the detection rates of earnings management through loan loss provisions from 250 tests where the 
null hypothesis of zero discretionary loan loss provisions is rejected against positive discretionary loan loss provisions 
(Panel A) or negative discretionary loan loss provisions at the 5% significance level using one-tailed t-test. In panel 
A (B), discretionary loan loss provisions equal to 1 (-1), 3 (-3), and 5 (-5) bps of loans are seeded into 100 randomly 
selected bank-quarters from either the aggregate sample (column 1) or each of the five quintiles of bank-quarters 
ranked by nonperforming loan change (columns 2-5).  
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TABLE 9 
Replicating Liu and Ryan (2006) Table 2 
 LLP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
HIGHROA -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.001 -0.001 
 (-7.94) (-6.22) (-1.53) (-1.40) 
HOM% -0.010*** -0.007*** -0.001 -0.001 
 (-4.73) (-3.70) (-1.03) (-1.00) 
X -0.006 0.032 0.102*** 0.102*** 
 (-0.10) (0.57) (3.42) (3.42) 
X*HIGHROA 0.154*** 0.103** -0.017 -0.018 
 (3.44) (2.38) (-0.74) (-0.77) 
X*HOM% 0.191** 0.172** -0.024 -0.022 
 (2.38) (2.20) (-0.58) (-0.53) 
CAP -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-7.55) (-7.82) (-3.30) (-3.48) 
ΔNPL 0.058** 0.322*** 0.135*** 0.164*** 
 (2.20) (5.99) (8.30) (5.09) 
NCO   0.884*** 0.880*** 
   (26.80) (27.52) 
DΔNPL  0.000  0.000*** 
  (0.45)  (2.84) 
DΔNPL*ΔNPL  -0.483***  -0.027 
  (-7.62)  (-0.72) 
Fixed effects Year Year Year Year 
N 3183 3183 3183 3183 
adj. R2 0.322 0.378 0.775 0.775 
This table examines the effect of alternative loan loss provisioning models on Liu and Ryan’s (2006) finding with 
respect to banks’ earnings smoothing during the 1990 economic booms. Column (1) replicates their main finding using 
bank-year observations at the intersection of Bank Compustat Annual database and FR Y-9C bank holding company 
reports. Columns (2) - (4) add asymmetric nonlinearity, concurrent net loan charge-offs (NCO), and both asymmetric 
nonlinearity and concurrent net loan charge-offs respectively. Following Liu and Ryan, we adjust standard errors using 
White heteroscedasticity-consistent estimator.   
